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The 2007-8 banking crisis in the advanced economies has exposed 
deficiencies in risk management and prudential regulation approaches 
that rely too heavily on mechanical, albeit sophisticated, risk 
management models. These have aggravated private and economic 
losses, while perhaps protecting the taxpayer from bearing quite as 
high a share of the direct costs as in typical crises of the past.  
Policymakers and bankers need to recognize the limitations of rules-
based regulation and restore a more discretionary and holistic 
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Given the efforts over the past decade to refining the prudential regulation of banks 
all over the world it could be considered astonishing that the advanced economies 
find themselves in 2008 the midst of a wide-ranging banking and financial crisis.  
 
Ironically, it seems that increasing over-reliance on sophisticated but mechanical risk-
management models lured bankers and regulators alike into a false sense of security.  
The shocking realization that these systems had failed to prevent serious losses 
resulted in a panicked reaction on the part of many market participants.  Their 
revulsion has resulted in a protracted period of illiquidity in interbank and other short-
term money markets and generated a credit crunch.  Thus, although crystallized fiscal 
costs of the crisis have so far been small, official lending to distressed institutions is 
growing rapidly likely entailing future costs and economic activity threatens to dip 
well below capacity for some time. 
 
This paper begins by placing the present crisis in the context of historic experience; 
there are many commonalities, and some evident novelties,  but the role of 
mechanical risk-modelling is seen as especially distinctive this time.  Section 2 takes 
a look at the costs, distinguishing between direct private and public costs, and overall 
economic costs.  Section 3 considers what messages can be learnt for prudential 
regulation.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
1.  Nature of this crisis In order to draw the correct policy lessons, we need to understand the nature of the 
crisis.  Recent commentary has tended to emphasize commonalities between what has 
been happening to the banking system in the past year with crises of the past.  Classic 
accounts of previous crises have been dusted down.   
 
If history explains all, how is it that the same errors were made, and in particular not 
detected and prevented by prudential regulation?  After all, lessons were learnt from 
past experience and embodied in national policy structures.  The US Savings and 
Loan debacle of the late 1980s, and the East Asian and Russian crises of 1997-8 led 
to a considerable effort to upgrade the policy and regulatory environment.  This 
included the introduction of prompt corrective action in the US, adoption of the more 
sophisticated risk management tools of Basel 2, and the preparation of regular 
Financial Stability Reports by or for financial authorities in advanced and developing 
countries.
1  And banking has been conducted against a background of 




                                                
 
The background and evolution of the crisis has indeed exhibited a number of fea
well-known from previous bank crises worldwide (Honohan, 1997; Caprio and 
Honohan, 2005, 2008, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  Specifically, there was over-
optimism as displayed in particular by very inexpensive risk-pricing reflected in
 
1 For example, the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) has, since 1999, 
conducted in depth studies of financial systems in three-quarters of the member countries, including 
major banking home countries such as Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom; but not yet the United States (or China). 
  2historically risk premia (Shiller, 2005).  This was especially pronounced in the 
housing market in the US, the UK and several other economies (including Ireland, 
which had the most pronounced run-up in house prices).  To a considerable extent th
over-optimism was encouraged by and embodied in financial innovation which has 
once again proved to be a source of systemic risk. Observers have stressed the
to which financial firms have borrowed short and lent long (though maturity 
transformation is almost a definition of banking).  The crisis was preceded by rapid 
credit growth—a classic danger sign both at the level of individual banks and at the
level of the system as a whole.  Illiquidity and insolvency have proved, one again, 
very hard to disentangle.  Principal-agent problems have emerged in several quarters 
as they always do in such cases when innovation is intense.  Regulatory arbitrage ha












Against this background, some of the more novel features of the recent experien
can be interpreted as merely variants on previous experience.  The originate-to-
distribute model of mortgage finance (often accompanied by predatory lending
exploitative of gullible borrowers) entailed severe agency problems that were 
manifested by reckless disregard of default risks.  Flawed incentive structures in th
relation between credit rating agencies and banks is another example of principal-
agent problems and also once again illustrated the risks associated with financial 
innovation. The use by banks of conduits and special investment vehicles to move 
parts of their asset portfolio off-balance sheet (thereby escaping some mechanical 
rules-based capital requirements) and financed with short-term borrowings is a fo
  3of regulatory arbitrage and an example of the perennial desire of banks to make 
 
iven 




sary adjustments to large and deep-seated  international 
acroeconomic imbalances this time too is aggravating the home-grown problems of 
nking 
isplaced confidence in the overall effectiveness of risk management techniques 
   
                                                
money from maturity transformation.   
 
But crises differ in important details and even in the character of the main driving
forces. That is why they recur.  “This time it will be different” is the response g
b
moves into risky territory; and indeed it usually is, though not in a good way. 
 
In particular, it is important to recognize that the banking problems that have now
emerged are not simply a by-product of a generalized macroeconomic adjustment o
exogenous repricing  of risk.  It is true that some banking crises of the past have 
happened as a result of an economy-wide correlated wave of generalized euphoria
that inevitably ended in disappointment and revulsion.
2 And the coincidence of other 
adverse shocks and neces
m
the banking sector itself. 
 
For, this time, much of the euphoria has actually related to the innovation in ba
risk-management technology itself.  This is most spectacularly evidenced in the 
relaxation of mortgage lending standards (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008) driven by 
m
based on automated credit-scoring of primary borrowers and on rated securitization.
 
 
2 See Čihák and Schaeck (2007) for a characterization of the literature categorizing this dynamic into 
five generations of models. 
  4The seemingly sophisticated regulatory framework so recently evolved also turned
out not to be robust to the latest variations.  Its complexity lulled both regulator 




impler protections of old – more so indeed because of its apparent rules-based 






 small deviations in average 
efault rates on the underlying mortgages or in assumed correlations had a drastic and 
unforeseen impact on the value of some of the tranches.  
                                                
s
sophistication which actually encouraged leveraged arbitrage on a vast scale. 
 
At the heart of the crisis, at least in its first year, were problems with complex 
s
payments on primary loans, especially US relatively low grade residential mortgage
 
As discussed in greater detail below, many of the mortgage-backed securities have 
proved much less valuable than they seemed at issue.  This was not just because o
falling house prices, but also partly because the mortgages had been missold to people
who couldn’t afford to service them and partly because the propensity to default 
increased.  But especially important was the extent to which the officially-authorized
rating agencies used risk models to assign what proved to be overoptimistic ratings to 
these securities.  Trusting the ratings, banks and other investors acquired these over-
rated securities in great volume. Alas, not only did the assigned ratings underestim
the probability of loss (because of optimistic assumptions
3 fed into the risk models), 
but many of the top-rated securities, carefully structured to be compatible with a 
model-generated AAA rating, had built-in fragility.  Even
d
 
3 Calomiris (2008) shows how a plausible but fatal misinterpretation of previous US default experience 
could have seemed to justify the assumed average default rates.  
  5 
The mechanical risk models in use allocated insufficient risk capital to protect against 







too far—a dimension which has become virtually 
nregulated in recent times 
y, but 
n made and costs imposed on 
overnments and on the economy more widely. 
th
 
The sudden downgrading and fall in market price of even senior tranches of many
these securitizations during 2007 not only imposed losses on banks directly, but 
increased the cost of funds for banks generally.  Not knowing where the location
all of the losses, and shocked by the scale of the failure of rating models, banks 
scrambled to ensure their own liquidity and became reluctant to assume counterpart
risk.  Three-month interbank rates jumped above the equivalent risk-free contract
and the spread has remained high now for over a year.  It was curtailed access to 
funding liquidity that triggered the failures of Northern Rock, Sachsen, IKB, Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers—institutions that had built their business mode
assured access to the short-term money markets.  Here too, reliance an over-
simplified model that neglected hard-to-quantify dimensions of risk meant that these 
institutions had not hedged the risk of losing access to funding liquidity.  Avail
liquidity was also leveraged 
u
 
As banks increased lending standards across the board, house prices fell back and 
economic slowdowns set in across many of the advanced economies at the time of 
writing a new wave of credit losses of a more familiar kind, not related to complex 
instruments, seemed in prospect.  Currently, this further wave is hard to quantif
it is already clear that substantial losses have bee
g
  6 
2. Costs 
concepts of cost have been employed in past comparative studies of banking 
rises.











A natural starting point is to look at actual credit-related losses suffered by banks and 
other intermediaries.  Nonbank investors including hedge funds, insurance companie
and others, have also been involved, and their interactions with the banking system 
have have been quite important. However, the present discussion will be con
banks.  Such estimates can be obtained from (a) write-downs; (b) modelled 
assumptions into the future for credits that have not yet been written-down; (c) mark-
to-market losses on asset-backed securities.  This is essentially the approach adopted 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008), who estimated total credit losses t
banks and other financial intermediaries as of March 2008 at around US$1 trillion.  
Banks are estimated to account for about half of these losses. This estimate has been 
criticized by the Bank of England (2008) for its important reliance on market prices 
of credit derivatives; the Bank of England argued that these markets were sufferin
 
4 Honohan (2002) distinguishes between three components of the cost of a banking crisis: (i) the stock 
component is the accumulated waste of economic resources (this would include the costs incurred by 
those to whom unaffordable mortgage were mis-sold); (ii) the public finance component of the true 
economic costs (which importantly is not the same as the fiscal bill); (iii) the flow component of the 
economic cost arising from the subsequent output slumps caused by the banking crisis.  The 
quantifications discussed below: total banking losses, fiscal costs and the dip in economic activity can 
be thought of as crude approximations to these three components respectively. 
  7from an asymmetric information bias (lemons effect) and did not provide a good 
approximation to an expected value of losses.
5  Although the Bank of Englan
argument is plausible, it seems fair to say that, in the months since these two 
benchmark estimates were published, emerging information makes the IMF’s 
pessimism seem
d’s 
 less extreme. Some commentators argue that it will prove an 
nderestimate. 
one 
h in 2007 
xceeded US$30 trillion, of which 1 trillion represents just 3 per cent. 
f 2½ 
ed banking assets plus 1½ per cent of European risk-
eighted banking assets.  
ed 
ig 
                                                
u
 
Taking the IMF number, should we regard US$1 trillion as large?  This depends on 
the relevant scaling factor.  Previous crises have been measured in terms of national 
GDP of the affected country. With the losses concentrated in the US and Europe, 
natural reference would be aggregate GDP of the US and the EU, whic
e
 
Using another approach to scaling, the IMF’s US$1 trillion represents the sum o
per cent of US risk-weight
w
 
Interestingly, as they crystallize, the vast bulk of the credit losses is being absorb
by shareholders of these institutions leaving  relatively little to be picked-up by 
government, let alone depositors and other creditors.  The largest banks reporting b
writedowns have been able to cope.  Although the net profits of UBS for the four 
years 2003-6 totalled CHF 40 billion, this is about the same as the total credit losses 
 
5 The Bank of England’s own much lower estimate of the likely total costs of the crisis was based 
instead on a projection of future losses based on assumptions about the migration of loans from non-
performing into loss status. 
  8that bank has reported to date in 2007-8.  Citigroup’s reported credit losses in 2007-8
to date were enough to wipe out almost al
 
l of the previous three year’s profits.  But 
ese and other large banks did not fail.   
een hit 
, 
ncy lending, or official support to distressed bank borrowers, have come into 




Of course the losses have not been distributed equally: some institutions have b
much harder and some have become insolvent; in those cases, official support





Estimates of fiscal costs for 56 crises in the past 50 years are provided by Caprio et al. 
(2005), updating Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) (CK).  The median fiscal cost for these was 
10.0 per cent of GDP (mean 14.3).  Looking just at the crises deemed systemic by CK, the 
median cost was 13.1 (mean 16.8).  Using these data, Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) showed 
that these costs were systematically higher the more accommodating and lenient was crisis-
management policy.   
The number of cases can be augmented by mapping known data on the proportion of non-
performing loans (NPLs) at the time of official intervention to fiscal losses.  By fitting a least 
squares regression between NPLs and losses for the countries for which both is available, we 
obtain a relationship that can be extrapolated to the counties for which only NPL data is 
available  This was done for Honohan (1997) and is updated here.  For the 93 countries in the 
augmented series the median fiscal cost is estimated at 13.2 per cent of GDP (mean 16.7); 
confining ourselves to the 78 crises deemed “systemic” by CK lifts the median percentage to 
15.5 (mean 19.1).  (Table 1)  
  9 
Such direct fiscal costs have imposed a heavy burden in numerous systemic banking 
crises over the past half-century.  Based on an extension of previous work to 93 crises
I estimate that the median systemic
 
 crisis may have generated a fiscal cost as high as 




ents net costs; the gross sums being lent or available for lending are 
uch greater).  
ency-
y becomes clear over several quarters; the full costs are rarely 
vident at first.  
1
 
So far, then, fiscal costs this time around have been remarkably small, relative to 
credit losses.  If we are to accept official estimates and projections at face value, 
US$75 billion would seem to cover net fiscal costs from the sums so far committed
This would include the bailouts of Bear Stearns, Northern Rock, and the two state-
owned German banks Sachsen and IKB, and the depositor compensation for Indy
and other closed banks in the US, combined with the US Congressional Budget 
Office’ s expected cost estimate of the decision to have the US Treasury support the 
two big Government-sponsored financial agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and 




Such a figure – about ¼ per cent of the sum of national GDPs in the US plus the 
European Economic Area – is quite low by the standards of previous crises (see 
Figure 1).  But that figure is quite likely to increase, perhaps by a lot.  It is only a 
fraction of the gross sums that are being lent.  It only counts recognized solv
related interventions, and previous experience shows that the need for such 
interventions onl
e
  10 
Aggregate economic costs 
If it is hard to obtain reliable data on the fiscal cost of banking crises, it is even m
difficult to pinpoint the other dimensions of cost.  Attempts have been made to 
capture a rough estimate of the additional flow economic costs in previous crises, 
typically by comparing actual aggregate output (GDP) with some hypothetical 
crisis’’ output path.  One version of this approach to estimating the cost of the 
subsequent output dip was proposed by the IMF in its 1998 World Economic 
Outlook, and has been widely employed  (cf. Hoggarth et al., 2002).  Using this





triguingly is of the same order of magnitude on average (Honohan, 2002).   
ide 
 comparing the dip in 
ctivity of sectors that are more and less bank-dependent. 
me 
issues), the liquidity premia and generalized uncertainty about counterparty risk are 
in
 
Not all of these output slumps will have been caused by the accompanying banking 
crisis – often a latent banking crash only becomes evident when it is triggered by an 
exogenous economic shock that also directly contributed to recession.  By examining 
the sectoral pattern of previous economic downturns, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2005) show 
that banking crises do tend to have an independent effect on output, and they prov
a ranking of credit crunch-induced economic downturns by
a
 
The credit losses are having knock-on effects depressing the macroeconomy this ti
also.  Reductions in bank capital (even though partly made good with new equity 
  11all contributing to a re-pricing of risk which has the effect of restricting or shutting 
down credit access to a large range of borrowers throughout the economy.
6   
 
The ability of banks to recapitalize is of central importance in determining the extent 
and depth of credit crunch. Greenlaw et al. (2008) stress the multiplier effect on credit 
(and thereby on GDP) of  reductions in bank capital due to credit losses.  There is 
some empirical evidence for this; bank capital is generally included as a control in 
bank-level modelling of changes in lending (cf. Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2008). The 
links in this chain are not all immutable ones, though.  Capital can be replenished, and 
there is some elasticity in leverage employed by banks and other financial 
intermediaries.  Indeed, the recent study by Adrian and Shin (2008) showed the way 
in which investment banks can and do manage their portfolios very actively.  When 
their risk appetite increases, they both build up their capital and their total assets, and 
vice versa.  This proactive behaviour is quite unlike the generally passive asset 
management strategies followed by households, for which losses impacting their total 
assets and net equity position result in a negative correlation between changes in 
assets and in leverage.  (Although there has been some convergence of behaviour 
between commercial and investment banking, according to Adrian and Shin the 
behaviour of commercial banks – which tend to target a given leverage ratio – and of 
non-financial corporations is intermediate).  This suggests that changes in risk 
appetite, not in intermediary capital, are the main drivers of credit availability.  Of 
course, credit losses can dent confidence as much as capital; but capital can be 
replenished, and it will be if confidence is restored.  Indeed, major banks have raised 
                                                 
6 Numerous sources document the reduction in credit availability including surveys of borrowers and 
of lenders as documented by the Bank of England, ECB and US Federal Reserve. 
  12upwards of US$ 300 billion in new capital in the past year.  Ensuring the background  
conditions that facilitate the raising new capital is where macroeconomic and 
regulatory policy can help.   
 
Falling house prices in several major economies and the high oil prices make growth 
in the relevant economies rather sensitive to the credit crunch; and the sharper the 
growth slowdown, the more likely are further credit losses.  Indeed the worsening 
position of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac leading to their nationalization in September 
2008 seems to reflect this general worsening of credit conditions rather than financial 
engineering deficiencies.  Current macroeconomic projections suggest that the output 
dip in the US plus EU relative to what was expected in July 2007 will be well over 1 
per cent in 2008 alone—much higher than the figure given above for fiscal costs from 
recognized interventions.  And the process is unlikely to have worked itself out for 
another couple of years. 
 
An interesting feature of the distribution of costs here is the degree to which 
international risk transfer has been prominent, reflecting the now well-established 
globalization of finance.
7  Although the figure is not weighted by asset quality, it 
seems that European financial institutions have absorbed a sizable share of the risk 
embodied in credit risk transfer instruments such as securitized mortgages (Figure 
2).   This reflected in the prominence of non-US  banks among the league table of th
8 e 
                                                 
h not always—escaped the worst of 
ducts 
 (This 
7 In many previous crises, international banks have often—thoug
the crisis (cf. the striking discussion by Díaz-Alejandro, 1985). 
8 The figure illustrates the statement by Joint Forum (2008, p. 10) that US credit risk transfer pro
(CRTs) were distributed roughly equally between US, European and Asian investors; European 
CRTs—which formed a sizable minority of the total, were sold about 60-40 to Europe and Asia. 
  13banks with the biggest reported credit losses to date; 15 of the 24 banks in Table 2
which shows reported credit losses by major banks since start of the crisis, are 
headquartered outside the US. 
 
, 
. Implications for regulatory style: rules vs. discretion 
More regulation” is the cry, but what should the priorities be and are there pitfalls 
e 
ne dimension – not dealt with here – relates to liquidity. Is it enough to rely on the 
t 
 
nother dimension is consumer protection: the need to avoid mis-selling of 
ortgage 








lender of last resort to deal with the kind of systemic drought of funding liquidity tha
has been observed?  But the alternatives are problematic. After all, the social costs of 
a drastic reduction in maturity transformation could be considerable, yet that is what 
would be needed to preclude what happened to Bear Stearns, who ran through US$20
billion of cash in a week. 
 
A
unaffordable mortgages.  Many unsophisticated borrowers were misled by m
salespersons (“originators”) – for example by use of teaser rates offering an initial 
period of lower amortization – and undertook repayment commitments which they 
 
suggests that perhaps a third of the total risk transferred was taken up in net terms by Asia, with 
Europe also accumulating a modest new amount of additional risk, and the US a net shedder of risk 
through these mechanisms).  Further detailed analysis of this aspect is contained in Beltran et al. 
(2008), who judge that European banks were not disproportionately exposed to mortgage-backed 
securities relative to their holdings of other US obligations. 
  14could not afford (“predatory lending”).  This too we will not discuss further here in 
order to focus on solvency regulation. 
 
What is noteworthy about the major losses surrounding the sub-prime debacle is the 
ome have suggested that the structure of the models used for risk management was 
he shortfall in mortgage servicing from this sub-prime lending should have been 
 
nd 
                                                
extent to which they have been associated with (i) the failure of mechanical risk-
management tools and (ii) losses that were so far outside the projected range of 
possibilities that they imply modelling error.  
 
S
adequate but the distributional assumptions about shocks was too optimistic: tails not 
fat enough.  In other words, just bad luck to be hit by a large exogenous shock. 
 
T
anticipated by the originators and by the arranger who acquired the stream of 
payments and structured them; it was not a random shock.
 9 Some have rightly
stressed the agency problems involved: in effect arguing that some originators a
arrangers knew but did not care that they were selling on substandard products.  In 
addition, though, the success of automated credit scoring systems in other contexts 
will have made it seem excusable to cut corners and not bother to exercise 
 
9 Although falling house prices are an important part of the story, It is important to note that the 
defaults on recent sub-prime mortgages in the US are higher than can be predicted from house price 
movements and borrower characteristics.  Underwriting quality thus fell steadily from 2001; the 
deterioration was masked by the boom in house prices (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2008).  A careful 
analysis of US default experience reveals that “homeownerships that begin with a subprime purchase 
mortgage end up in foreclosure almost 20 percent of the time, or more than 6 times as often as 
experiences that begin with prime purchase mortgages” (Gerardi et al., 2008). 
  15independent judgment in underwriting.  Of course, the reality is quite the re
statistical risk models are to yield usable guidance, they must be fed reliable inputs.  
 
verse: if 
 many cases, minor structural deficiencies in the models were systematically 
e 
hic 
he most obvious example of such catastrophic failure is the astonishing decline in 
nches 
 key element of what seems to have happened here is that the rating agencies 
ities 
In
exploited by bankers, knowingly or unknowingly, to build an unstable and brittl
cantilever-like structure supporting sizable expected returns at the risk of catastrop
failure.
10   
 
T
the market price of AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities, especially the so-called 
Mezzanine CDOs, which repackaged bundles of low-rated mortgage backed 
securities in such a way as to squeeze the maximum amount of AAA-rated tra
out of assumed lack of correlation between the underlying mortgages.  
 
A
assumed correlations between the default rates of the underlying mortgage secur
that were too low.
 11  As such, it was relatively easy for ABS arrangers to construct 
                                                 
10 Consider the applicability to the present context of the warning given by Weitzmann (2008) in the 
sts before the crisis broke.  For 
 
context of global warming:  If we are uncertain about the parameters of a stochastic risk model, if the 
tails of the distribution of the true model are fat, and if the costs of outcomes in that tail are large, then 
neglect of this uncertainty can give dramatically wrong conclusions. 
11 The danger of precisely this error was highlighted by some speciali
example, Duffie (2008), in a June 2007 conference presentation wrote: “Even specialists in CDOs are
currently ill equipped to measure the risks and fair valuation of tranches that are sensitive to default 
correlation….Currently, the weakest link in the risk measurement and pricing of CDOs is the 
modelling of default correlation.”   
  16AAA-rated (and hence low-yield) securities from high-yield mortgages that generated 
substantial surpluses to be distributed as fees (and income to the equity tranches).  
The more the lower-than-actual correlations could be exploited in security 
construction (as with multi-layered securitizations such as Mezzanine CDOs and 
CDO-squareds), the more this modelling error was likely to result in sizable rating 
errors on the senior tranches.
 12,13  The global appetite for AAA-rated securities being 
high, this mechanism opened the door to a very large increase in tail risk, when losses 




Here again agency problems arose. They related not only to internal remuneration 
incentives in the various firms involved, but also to the shared interest of arrangers 
                                                 
12 Ironically it may have been the tranches priced as least risky that may have experienced the worst 
net yields: the (“toxic waste”) equity tranches could have received juicy rewards in some cases perhaps 
for long enough to make good returns (Ashcraft and Scheurmann, 2008).  Indeed, underestimating 
asset correlations in a securitized portfolio has the effect of lowering the likely losses on the equity 
tranche for any given average default rate (Belsham et al., 2005)   Note, though, that some CDOs had 
additional protections for the senior tranches, such as default triggers giving the senior tranche 
investors the option to liquidate the collateral. 
13 On May 21, 2008 the Financial Times reported that Moody’s uncovered a programming error in its 
model for valuing another form of credit derivative, namely CPDOs.  Apparently the error resulted in 
some tranches being rated 4 notches above where they should have been.  The high ratings puzzled 
some observers, but enabled the tranches to be sold at low yields.    
14 This feature is reflected for example in the very steep downgrades that occurred for some AAA rated 
ABS CDOs in 2007.   The median downgrade among almost 200 such securities was 7 notches – a 
steeper downgrade than occurred in any comparably rated corporate bond for at least four decades 
(Joint Forum, 2008) 
  17and the rating agencies in doing business even if it meant exaggeration of ratings.  
And this is not the first batch of rated securitizations to suffer default rates well in 
excess of what their initial ratings would have suggested. 
 
Another illustration of the vulnerability of mechanical risk management tools comes 





igh-risk high-return strategies can thus allow other more hidden, opportunities for 
                                                
fr
losses so far reported in the crisis.  According to UBS’s report to shareholders, one of
the largest single sources of loss, accounting for more than a third of the bank’s tota
losses, were assets described by the safe-sounding term “Amplified Super Seniors” in 
which the risk of loss was initially hedged through the purchase of protection from an
insurer.  Because of their AAA rating and the hedge, these assets were regarded as 
very safe and exempt from risk scrutiny, allowing them to be accumulated in large 
quantities by the relevant desks of the bank.  The proportion hedged was, however, 
unfortunately limited to the first 2-4 per cent of loss.
15  Because the insurance was 
only first-loss, and the volume of assets large, the bank was much more highly 
vulnerable to model error or large shocks than its risk managers recognized.   
 
Complacent over-reliance on mechanical risk-management rules that shut-off s
h
leveraging risk.  In the presence of moral hazard, this combination can even amplify 
overall risk. 
 
15 The bank states that “this level of hedging was based on statistical analyses of historical price 
movements that indicated that such protection was sufficient to protect UBS from any losses on the 
position” (UBS, 2008, p. 14).  The level of hedging also seems to have been designed to meet internal 
risk-management rules (Hughes et al., 2008) 
  18 
The danger that even simple risk-management rules could actually amplify risk has 




volved don’t themselves realize the risks they are imposing on 
eir institutions, perhaps they assume they have detected and are exploiting a market 
 
all 
gulators is to rely much less exclusively on mechanical risk 
ssessment models (which, however, provide an essential input), and instead take a 
b
and Stiglitz, 2001, pp. 42-4).  The circumstances under which this might happen are 
limited, but I suggest that the increased complexity and sophistication of the 
mechanical rules has meant that the remaining opportunities to game these rules resul
in much greater moral hazard.  This, I believe, is what we have seen in the cu
crisis.  Most of the big losses have resulted from some unit within a bank seeking to 
exploit a profit opportunity that requires very high volumes to be worthwhile and 
which exploits instrument design depending crucially on the accuracy of complex ris
management models 
 
Perhaps the bankers in
th
anomaly, or perhaps they don’t care.  In the last case, the ethical line may not be that 
great between the behaviour of such bankers and that of rogue traders (think of 
Société Générale’s Jerome Kerviel; AIB’s Rusnak and Baring’s Leeson) who are said
to have exceeded their authorized volume limits in the process of leveraging a sm
expected percentage gain.  The huge scale of the bets unite them; the differences are 
legally distinguishable but operationally close (one breaches rules he thinks will not 
be enforced if he wins from the greater risk assumed; the others are bending rules to 
assume greater risk). 
 
The implication for re
a
  19more traditional and holistic
16 view (which would include taking account of the 
possibility of model error and that it will be exploited).  This implies building-in 
much higher margins of error in capital requirements – especially at times of rapi
growth in balance sheets (as with the speed limits mentioned by Honohan and 
Stiglitz, 2001); close scrutiny (and risk-penalization) of gross positions for regulated
or systemically important institutions, and much greater attention to personal 
incentive structures.  Effective supervision requires a qualitative assessment of these 
institutions’ overall risk management systems (not merely their mathematical 
models).  Principles need to be elevated relative to mechanical rules which can and 
always will be gamed.  The more precise the mechanical rules, the easier to game a
the more dangerous the games can become. 
 





n as consistent with some of the rhetoric 
f Basel 2, notably its Pillar 2 which emphasizes regulatory discretion.  But it also 
k 
.  Concluding remarks 
he structured finance crisis that has hit banking institutions on both sides of the 
ut against a background of macroeconomic imbalances and 
the reversal of overly-optimistic risk pricing.  But the extensive banking losses are 
                                                
o
casts doubt on the heavy reliance placed by much of the Basel discussions on the use 
of sophisticated but necessarily imperfect mathematical and statistical models of ris





Atlantic is working itself o
 
16 Lack of integration of risk management  procedures was identified bin the follow-up to the Société 
Générale losses (Société Générale, 2008) 
  20substantially attributable to failings within the banking sector itself.  I have argued
that some of the failures, both at the level of the banks and at the level of the 
regulators, results from over-reliance on mechanical risk-management models, such
as have been given great emphasis in Basel 2.  The power and sophistication of thes
models must not be allowed to displace the kind of discretionary and holistic r
management culture that acknowledges the dangers of wilful or accidental model 
misspecification or mis-application.  This broader perspective is already embodied in 
pillar 2 of Basel 2, and is a constant refrain of risk management manuals (cf. Institu
of International Finance, 2008; Senior Supervisors’ Group, 2008), but has in practi
been displaced by an imperfect technology. 
  
While they may have contributed to the crisis, the new risk-management techniques 







tection of problems in large banks, and 
lowed the losses to be stemmed before the bank’s survival was endangered.  In this 
ces 
nks have been able to deal with 
eir structured-finance related problems before they got so deep as to require official 
al
context, it is significant that most of the banks that have actually been intervened by 
the public authorities had specialized heavily in mortgage finance or structured 
finance. Large diversified banks had additional revenue sources and held sizable 
capital to cover risks across their entire business. 
 
Advances in technical risk-management may thus have protected the public finan
this time around so far, in that large diversified ba
th
intervention.   
 
  21But the excessive double leverage – of capital and liquidity – adopted by 
overconfident risk managers produced a whiplash effect which has resulted now in a 
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Table 1:  Estimated fiscal costs of previous crises 
 
Costs  
(% of GDP)  CK estimates  Augmented estimates 
  All in database  Systemic only  All in database  Systemic Only 
Mean  14.3 17.1 16.7 19.1 
Median  10.0 13.2 13.2 15.5 
Upper  quartile  14.0 16.7 24.0 27.7 
Lower  quartile  3.0 5.0 5.0  10.0 
No.  of  cases  56 45 93 78 
 
Note: CK estimates are drawn from Caprio et al. (2005).  Augmented estimates are based on the fitted 
regression line linking data on costs of different national crises from the CK estimate cases with non-








Table 2: Reported credit losses by major banks 2007-8
 
Bank   US$ bn    Bank   US$ bn 
Citigroup              USA  55.1    Wells Fargo   USA  10.0 
Merrill Lynch          USA  52.2    Credit Agricole        FRA  8.5 
UBS                    CHE  44.2    Barclays               GBR  7.6 
HSBC                   GBR  27.4    Canadian Imperial (CIBC)   CAN  7.0 
Wachovia     USA  22.7    Fortis                 BEL/NLD   6.9 
Bank of America      USA  21.2    HBOS   GBR  6.7 
Washington Mutual        USA  14.8    Bayerische Landesbank  DEU  6.7 
Morgan Stanley         USA  14.4    Société Générale       FRA  6.4 
IKB Deutsche Industrie         DEU  14.3    Mizuho Financial       JPN  6.0 
JPMorgan Chase        USA  14.3    ING Groep  NLD  6.0 
Royal Bank of Scotland      GBR  14.0         
Lehman Brothers        USA  13.8    Subtotal    400.2 
Deutsche Bank    DEU  10.0         
Credit Suisse          CHE  10.0    Worldwide    510.8 
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Figure 1: Historic crises: fiscal costs and GDP per head. 
(The square marker indicates 2007-8 based on officially recognized solvency interventions to date 
Source: see Box and text) 
Crisis database cost 






















Figure 2: Estimated proportionate pattern of credit risk transfer  
(The pie represents all credit risk transferred globally from the US and Europe.  Each slice represents 
intra or inter-regional transfers.  Thus ‘EUR from EUR’ represents the credit risk transferred from one 
European institution to another; ‘ROW from US’ represents credit risk emanating from the US and 
assumed by an institution in the Rest of the World.  Source: based on Joint Forum, 2008) 
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